In late January 2008, three aid workers from the international medical aid agency Doctors without Borders were killed in the city of Kismayo in southern Somalia. A remote-controlled explosive device was detonated as they drove back from the hospital where they worked. In the past seven months alone, 21 staff of non-governmental organizations have been killed in the troubled Horn of Africa country.

Unfortunately, Somalia is not the exception. The number of violent incidents involving aid workers has dramatically increased in the past few years. No official statistic is available because of competing definitions of terms like "civil society" and "assistance", but the incidents have affected international non-governmental organizations as well as the Red Cross and United Nations agencies.

The deliberate targeting of civilians and aid workers is a grave breach of international humanitarian law and constitutes a war crime. It is not a new phenomenon, but one that challenges the modus operandi of aid agencies as they adjust to an increasingly constrained environment, known in the industry's jargon as 'the shrinking of humanitarian space.'

Leaving aside the proximate causes, which differ wildly depending on the context, there are three possible explanations for this rise in violence.

First, there are simply more aid workers directly exposed to conflict situations than a decade ago. Outside the core countries of the war on terror, there is a global pattern of humanitarian action substituting for diplomatic initiatives to respond to conflict situations, which too often places aid workers in harm's way while diplomats and soldiers alike remain above the fray. Second, recent U.S. military involvement in several conflicts has made funding readily available for humanitarian agencies, encouraging a proliferation of projects in insecure areas.

Finally, as an outgrowth of this funding, donor -driven projects in war zones amalgamate Western geo-political interests with the objectives of humanitarian actors. In places like Afghanistan, international donors' assistance is provided not according to needs, but on the basis of strategic military interests. Schools are built and food is delivered in the provinces where soldiers are deployed.

Humanitarian principles such as independence and impartiality have been brushed aside in the name of efficiency. Non-governmental organizations are seen as 'force multipliers' in the words of former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell. From there, it is only a short leap for insurgent groups to claim aid agencies as fair targets.

In response to the increased level of violence, humanitarian organizations have mimicked their governmental donors by shielding themselves behind sophisticated security measures. Even in relatively safe cities such as Nairobi, Kenya, aid agencies' offices are located in guarded compounds surrounded by ten feet high walls topped by barbed wire. International staff go around from compound to compound, rarely mixing with the local population.

In Kabul, Afghanistan, the entire international community has literally fortified itself. Aid agencies' compounds have become fortresses rivaling embassies for the most intricate barricades of sandbags, armed mercenaries and spiked barriers. Even restaurants have had to increase their security so as to retain their expatriate clientele.

Nowadays, a typical international aid worker not so much lives in Kabul city, as hops from one international organization's fortified compound to another in a parallel world that bears no relation to the life of an ordinary Afghan citizen. Multi-million dollar projects are designed behind closed, bullet-proof doors, with little input from the intended recipients. It is inevitable that the effectiveness of the aid - which includes the design, implementation and follow-up of projects - suffers. The price of security, it seems, is lack of partnership and accountability.

From the comfort of distance, it may seem inconsiderate to disparage security measures. Every week, reports of new attacks on humanitarian workers remind us of the difficult environment that these individuals work in. However, the unfortunate consequence of this expatriate bubble is that protective layers effectively separate humanitarian workers from the very people they seek to help. There is little or no interaction between them.

Security measures are easier to ramp up than they are to scale down. In an increasingly volatile world, the likelihood is that aid agencies will continue to operate under these constraints for years to come. If international organizations can't deliver services, the void is likely to be filled by local grass-roots organizations. These groups have in-depth knowledge of the situation and are often better suited to assess the needs of a community. The advantages of local non-governmental organizations are numerous: experience with administrations and local customs; cost effectiveness; and the ability to follow-up on projects years down the line.

In Iraq however, the inability of international aid agencies to access the population and the reluctance of international donors to fund local humanitarian groups, has given the opportunity to political non-state actors, primarily the sectarian militias, to distribute food, oil and other basic resources. As a result these militias are recruiting civilians to their cause.

The manipulation of aid, whether by international donors or by local militias, is a violation of humanitarian principles and a disservice to the most vulnerable people. The safety of aid workers should remain a priority, but agencies need to find a middle ground which allows them to maintain their collaboration and solidarity with those truly vulnerable.

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